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From mobile phones to cattle: how the Court of Justice is reframing the approach to 
Article 101 (formerly 81 EC Treaty) of the EU Treaty 
 
By Arianna Andreangeli• 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper considers the implications of the preliminary ruling in the case of Competition 
Authority v Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers Meats (hereinafter referred 
to as Barry Brothers)1  for the legal standards applicable to restrictions of competition ‘by object’ 
and analyse its wider impact on the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU (formerly Article 81 EC 
Treaty).2  Its first part will examine whether this preliminary ruling is consistent with the existing 
principles governing the application of Article 101(1) EU Treaty to “restructuring deals”. The 
second will briefly consider the principles governing the application of Section 1 of the US 
Sherman Act and in the light of this examination will try to gauge the wider ramifications of Barry 
Brothers for the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.   
         The paper will argue that the Court of Justice of the EU, responsive to the call for a 
“modernised” interpretation of this provision, applied some of the elements characterising the 
more flexible and “economics-principled” approach hitherto relevant for ‘by effect’ cases to the 
assessment of prima facie restrictions by object.  In this respect it will illustrate that the Court, 
despite continuing to rely on the “dichotomy” between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ restrictions, 
scrutinised the goals and the content of the arrangement by taking into account its actual 
context, according to a similar pattern of analysis to that of “less serious” infringements.   
         The paper will conclude that the Court of Justice, in a manner which displays some 
similarities with the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 1 of the US Sherman Act, 
seems now to adopt an interpretation of the prohibition clause inspired more by an idea of 
“continuum” between more and less serious infringements than by a relatively stark alternative 
between “by object” and “by effect” restrictions of competition.  It will be argued that while this 
distinction remains relevant for the purpose of determining the consequences of individual 
breaches, the Court’s framework of appraisal reserves antitrust intervention only for those 
arrangements that are either inherently incompatible with the function of Article 101 or result in 
an actual impairment of competition and therefore responds to the need to place the application 
of Article 101(1) TFEU on more solid economic footing. 
 
2. Barry Brothers and the principles governing “crisis cartels” 
 
2.1. ‘Crisis cartels’ in the Commission and the EU Courts’ practice: summary remarks 
 
The limited remit of this paper does not allow for a full consideration of the economic issues 
arising from “crisis cartels”, i.e. agreements establishing cooperation among competitors 
                                                 
• Lecturer in Law, Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool.  The author is extremely grateful to Prof. Barry 
Rodger of the University of Strathclyde for his comments on an earlier draft.  A previous version of this paper was 
presented at the Conference “After Lisbon: the future of European Law and Policy”, held at the University of 
Birmingham on 24/25 June 2010.  Many thanks are owed to Dr Luca Rubini for his feedback.  The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
1 Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers, [2008] ECR 
I-8637 (hereinafter referred to also as Barry Brothers). 
2 See case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad, [2002] ECR I-1577; case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcek v 
Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991; case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231.  
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operating in industries experiencing crisis and aimed bringing the situation “back on track”,3 for 
instance when a market presents excessive supply caused by the stagnation of demand.   
        In these cases it may be indispensable for rivals to jointly agree cuts of production if the 
dynamics of demand and supply cannot restore “normal” market conditions.4  However, since 
they result in concerted output reductions,5 these arrangements are incompatible with the 
guiding principle of Article 101, namely that each undertaking must be able to determine 
independently its conduct on the market.6  Accordingly, restructuring deals would only benefit 
from the legal exception of Article 101(3) TFEU in limited circumstances7 to tackle the 
consequences of industrial downturn and for a transient period.8  It must be shown that no 
lasting improvement can be forecast in the medium term in “normal” market conditions and that 
the cooperation entailed by the arrangement does not unduly restrain the freedom of the parties 
beyond what is strictly necessary to shed the overcapacity.9   In relation to the first condition of 
the legal exception,10 it must be demonstrated that these practices are capable of eliminating 
excessive capacity and, consequently, of restoring efficiency and competitiveness in the 
industry.11  As to the second condition that the arrangement afford consumers a “fair share” of 
their benefits, the parties must prove that any negative impact of the arrangements is at least 
offset by its positive outcomes and thus overall “neutral” for consumer welfare.12   
         To satisfy the third condition of “indispensability”, it must be established that the alleged 
benefits of the agreement cannot be secured through any less restrictive means: the 
arrangement must be limited in its duration and geographic scope and must not hamper the 
freedom of action of the parties beyond what is required to achieve its goals.13  Finally, the 
agreement must not entail the elimination of substantial competition from the relevant market by 
weakening any existing rivalry to the point that the latter is no longer capable of restraining the 
parties’ freedom of action,14 e.g. by conferring on them significant market power and/or 
foreclosing the market vis-à-vis actual or potential rivals.15    
         In its administrative practice under the “old” Implementing Regulation No 17/62, the 
Commission granted exemptions only in a limited number of cases.  The notifying parties were 
required to show not only that the market was in a situation of ongoing crisis caused by factors 
beyond their control and which could therefore only be resolved by concerted output 
                                                 
3 See, inter alia, JONES and SUFRIN, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, 2nd Ed., 2008: OUP, p. 807. 
4 Ibid.; see also pp. 237-238. 
5 See e.g. Commission Decision 84/380/EEC, Synthetic Fibres, 4 July 1984, [1984] OJ L207/17, para. 25-27. 
6 See e.g. joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, Suiker Unie and others v Commission, [1975] 
ECR I-1663, para. 173-175. 
7 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
[2001] OJ C2, para. 25; see also para. 18-19. 
8 See e.g. Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-41. For commentary,  inter alia, WHISH, 
Competition Law, 6th Ed., 2007: OUP, p. 600. 
9 Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-39. See also Commission XXIII Report on Competition 
Policy, para. 85.   
10 Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 39. 
11Ibid.  See also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 82 and 89; Commission Notice, Guidelines 
on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, [2001] OJ C2, para. 73-75, 84. 
12 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
[2001] OJ C2, para. 84-85. 
13 Ibid.; see also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 89.  For commentary, inter alia, FIEBIG, 
“European crisis cartels and the triumph of industrial policy over competition in Europe”, (1999) 25 Brook. J Int’l L 
607 at 614-615. 
14 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
[2001] OJ C2, para. 105, 107-108. 
15 Ibid.; see also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 89. 
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reductions.16 They also had to prove that the arrangement was limited in its duration and 
geographic scope17 and did not totally curtail any remaining competition, by preserving a certain 
degree of “uncertainty” as to the parties’ future behaviour and by not irremediably hampering 
any remaining competitive pressure from other rivals.18  
         The application of Article 101(3) TFEU to crisis cartel elicited mixed reactions: some 
commentators valued it as reflecting the idea that the application of the competition rules is not 
an “isolated phenomenon” but is strictly connected with the implementation of other policies, 
including those of an industrial or social nature.19 Other commentators regarded it as ‘distorting 
the legal interpretation of Article [101(3)]’ to implement goals of industrial policy20 and as 
threatening the effectiveness and consistence of competition law.21  
         Although the concerns for the coherence of antitrust enforcement were not totally 
unjustified, this view was difficult to reconcile with the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU: 
in Matra Hachette the Court recognised that there was no restraint that could not benefit from 
the application of Article 101(3) TFEU and that if they could be subsumed within its assessment 
framework, other not strictly economic goals could be relevant for the granting of an 
exemption.22  Consequently, the Court de facto approved the Commission’s practice of 
considering whether individual arrangements could have a positive impact on the achievement 
of other policy objectives.23   
         It is concluded that far from constituting an example of misuse of powers, the decisions 
concerning crisis cartels were fully compatible with the inner logic of the Treaty as a “complex 
tapestry” in which the pursuit of the “classical” goals of competition policy such as economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare have an impact on the achievement of other policy 
objectives.24  The next section will examine the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling in the Barry 
Brothers case and consider the extent to which the approach adopted by the Court “fits” within 
the principles that had hitherto guided the Commission practice in respect to crisis cartels. 
 
2.2. Reducing overcapacity in the Irish cattle market: the ‘Barry Brothers’ case 
 
2.2.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Section 2.1 considered the approach adopted by the Commission in respect to crisis cartels and 
argued that these decisions sought to employ Article 101(3) EU Treaty to achieve goals of 
industrial policy without running counter the principle of “attributed powers” enshrined in the 
Treaty.25  This section will consider the preliminary ruling in the Barry Brothers case.26  Barry 
Brothers arose from an application made by the Irish Competition Authority to the Irish High 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810), [1984] OJ L207/17, 
para. 28-29; see also para. 31-35. 
17 Inter alia, Commission decision 94/296/ECof 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten (IV/34.456), [1994] OJ 
L131/15, para. 32-34. 
18 Id., para. 39-40.  See also, mutatis mutandis, Commission decision 87/3/EEC of 4 December 1986—
ENI/Montedison (IV/31.055), [1987] OJ L5/13, especially paras. 7-8, 21-22, 33-35. 
19 HORNSBY, “Competition policy in the 80s: more policy less competition?”, (1987) 12(2) ELRev 79; also 
WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 600-601. 
20 FIEBIG, “European crisis cartels and the triumph of industrial policy over competition in Europe”, (1999) 25 
Brook. J Int’l L 607 at 619.   
21 Id., p. 634-636.  Cf. case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [1994] ECR II-595, para. 85, 109-110. 
22 Id., para. 110; see also, mutatis mutandis, case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1, para. 5. 
23 TOWNLEY, Article 81 EC and public policy, 2009: Oxford, Hart Publishing, p. 255. 
24 See e.g. id., pp. 274-283. 
25 Id., p. 255. 
26 Case C-209/07, above fn.1. 
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Court, seeking an order to restrain a number of meat producers from giving effect to their 
agreement aimed at restructuring the Irish cattle market, at the time in a serious crisis.27   
         Following an independent report that had highlighted structural over-capacity due to a 
considerable fall in demand,28 a number of beef suppliers devised a scheme entailing the 
closure of plants processing up to a quarter of the total meat production.  The firms that had 
agreed to relinquish their position on the market undertook to put their plants beyond use, 
accepted restrictions as to their future sale and use for a period of five years and the obligation 
not to compete with the “staying firms” for two years.  In exchange, they were entitled to receive 
a specific amount of compensation per head of cattle.  The Irish Competition Authority took 
objection to the proposed restructuring plan and was especially concerned with the risk that, as 
a result of shrinking supply, consumer prices would increase.29 
         However, the High Court found that the agreement did not have the object or the effect of 
restricting competition.30 The Court accepted that the industry suffered from long term structural 
overcapacity31 and held that contrary to the NCA’s allegations the BIDS agreement did not 
contain any restrictions of competition ‘by object’, such as clauses fixing prices, sharing 
customers, limiting output or investments.32  Mr Justice McKechnie adopted a very literal view of 
Article 101(1)(a) TFEU, according to which only those practices listed therein constituted “by 
object” infringements of the Treaty competition rules33 and rejected arguments that “slimming 
down” the overcapacity would have resulted in supply shortages and therefore in price 
increases34 or that the “exit clauses” contained would encourage collusion among the remaining 
firms.35  The Barry Brothers judgment was however appealed to the Irish Supreme Court, who 
in turn made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU under Article 267 TFEU 
asking whether the BIDS agreement could be regarded as having an anti-competitive object.  
The preliminary ruling will be examined in the next section. 
 
2.2.2. The ‘Barry Brothers’ preliminary ruling and its consequences for Article 101(1) 
 
         Section 2.2.1 offered a brief outline of the Barry Brothers case and emphasised that 
according to the Irish Competition Authority, the BIDS agreement constituted an infringement of 
Article 101(1) by object.  Before the Court of Justice, Advocate General Trstenjak reiterated that 
this provision entailed a “two stage examination” of prima facie anti-competitive practices:36 
firstly, it should be considered whether a given arrangement is prohibited by paragraph 1, 
having regard to its ‘object’ or its ‘effects’,37  and second, whether the practice meets the 
requirements of the legal exception contained in Article 101(3) TFEU.38  As to the specific 
question of whether the BIDS agreement constituted a restriction ‘by object, the Advocate 
General acknowledged that the very notion of “restraint of competition” remained ‘hard to 
                                                 
27 For commentary, see inter alia Van der VIJVER, “The Irish beef case”, (2009) 30(4) ECLR 198; also 
SVETLICINII, “ECJ’s ruling in beef industry case: competition law must be observed at all times”, (2008) 12 Eur. 
L. Reporter 402. 
28 “Preparing the beef industry for the 21st century”, prepared by McKinsey consultancy, Sept. 1998. 
29 See “The Competition Authority v BIDS”, available at: http://www.tca.ie/EN/Enforcing-Competition-Law/Civil-
Court-Cases/Beef-Industry.aspx.  
30 Competition Authority v BIDS, 27 July 2006, per Mr J McKechnie, [2006] IEHC 294. 
31Case C-209/07, above fn.1, para. 96. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Id., para. 98. 
34 Id., para. 105-107, 110-112. 
35 Id., para. 113; see also para. 115-117. 
36 Per AG Trstenjak, para. 39. 
37 Id., para. 37. 
38 Id., para. 38-39. 
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grasp’39 and should be appraised in light of the overall objective of Article 101.  Regard should 
be had to each practice’s legal and economic context and to whether it limited the parties’ 
freedom to determine their conduct independently on the market to such a degree as to have an 
appreciable adverse effect on the dynamics of competition.40   
        AG Trstenjak rejected suggestions that the list provided by Article 101(1) EU Treaty should 
be regarded as ‘exhaustive’41 and emphasised the need to consider the objective content of the 
agreement, its context and as far as it could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, the 
intention of the parties.42  She observed that there may be certain agreements which, despite 
restraining the freedom of action of the parties, would be overall ‘neutral’ for competition, for 
instance because they are “ancillary” to a separate, lawful transaction,43 have no appreciable 
impact on competition44 or are ‘ambivalent’45 to it, because they facilitate new entry in the 
market.46  
         As to the legality of the BIDS agreement, the Advocate General, however, stated that 
despite pursuing a ‘pro-competitive (…) primary objective which was unobjectionable from a 
competition point of view’,47 i.e. the restructuring of an industry in crisis, the arrangement 
restricted competition ‘by object’.48  She noted that the agreement had resulted in production 
cuts and in the withdrawal of a number of competitors from the industry, whose structure had 
been, as a consequence, modified in a way that could not be justified if not as the outcome of 
collusion.49  The imposition of flat ‘compensation levies’ on the firms that had opted for 
remaining active in the market50 and the limitation on the “going” firms’ freedom to dispose of 
their plants were regarded as stifling potential competition by erecting barriers to entry.51 Thus, 
AG Trstenjak concluded that the BIDS agreement had infringed Article 101(1) by reason of its 
object; however, she made clear that its supposed pro-competitive impact could be examined in 
the light of the framework of Article 101(3) TFEU to determine whether it could benefit from the 
legal exception.52   
         In its judgment53 the Court reiterated the “alternative” nature of the requirements listed in 
Article 101(1) TFEU and therefore held that it would not be necessary to consider the actual 
effects of the arrangement on the market conditions if it appeared from its content and purpose 
and on the basis of long standing experience that the agreement was ‘by [its] very nature 
injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.’54  The Court rejected allegations that 
since the BIDS arrangement lacked an anti-competitive animus it did not infringe Article 101(1) 
by reason of its object.55  Instead, it stated that regard should be had to the objective content of 
the arrangement and to the objectives that it sought to attain. In this context the subjective 
intention of the parties or even whether the arrangement pursued, along with anti-competitive 
                                                 
39 Id., para. 42. 
40 Id., para. 43. 
41 Id., para. 48-49. 
42 Id., para. 44-46. 
43 Id., para. 53. 
44 Id., para. 51. 
45 Id., para. 52. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Id., para. 94. 
48 Id., para. 62-63. 
49 Id., para. 78-81. 
50 Id., para. 83-86. 
51 Id., para. 87-93. 
52 See e.g. id., para. 99-101. 
53 Case C-209/07, above fn.1. 
54 Id., para. 16-17. 
55 Id., para. 19. 
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goals, other legitimate objectives would not be sufficient to exclude it from the scope of the 
prohibition.56  It was emphasised that the arrangement was aimed at allowing the parties, who 
together controlled 90% of the market, to ‘achieve their minimum efficient scale’ and thereby 
increase their profitability57 via a ‘common policy’ designed to reduce the industry’s structural 
overcapacity by 25% by encouraging some rivals to leave the market and thereby increasing its 
concentration.58    
         The BIDS agreement was therefore in conflict with Article 10159 because by resorting to 
the arrangement the parties would be able to refrain from engaging in fierce reciprocal rivalry, 
which would have, over time, led to ‘less efficient rivals’ being excluded from the market60 and 
would have avoided the costs associated with industrial restructuring.61  The Court held that 
fixing a fee to allow the staying firms to “buy the customers” of the undertakings that had agreed 
to leave the market hampered ‘the natural development of the market shares’ because it 
created an incentive for the parties to freeze production once the minimum efficient scale had 
been attained.62  As to the clause restricting the freedom of the undertakings that had agreed to 
cease trading to dispose of their plants, the Court agreed with the Irish Competition Authority 
that, since it would have been less costly for a newcomer to purchase an existing plant than to 
create a new one, this condition would have dissuaded potential competitors from attempting to 
enter the Irish cattle market and would have therefore artificially foreclosed it.63  
         It is difficult to understate the importance of Barry Brothers.  The Court of Justice was 
unimpressed by the claims that the BIDS agreement should not be caught by Article 101(1) 
TFEU solely on the ground that it allegedly aimed at tackling the crisis of the Irish meat 
industry64 and reiterated that “industrial policy” considerations concerning individual 
arrangements can only be analysed against the four conditions contained in Article 101(3), 
without affecting the anti-competitive nature of the arrangement.65  Perhaps most importantly, 
the Court rejected any attempt to read an exhaustive list of “serious infringements” into Article 
101(1) and concluded that the BIDS arrangement constituted a breach of that provision by 
reason of its ‘object’.66  It therefore is argued that this preliminary ruling represents a ‘warning 
call’ for undertakings operating in ‘distressed industries’, who are reminded that ‘hard economic 
times do not justify anti-competitive practices’.67   
         Against this background, it could be queried whether, had the Court been empowered to 
decide on the issue by the scope of the reference, it would have decided that the BIDS 
arrangement could benefit from the legal exception of Article 101(3).  It is submitted that, 
although there are significant procedural differences between the “old style exemptions” and the 
preliminary reference procedure, providing an answer to this question would have been relevant 
to decide whether the Commission’s practice relating to crisis cartel remains “good law” today.  
It is noted that just as in a number of pre-Regulation No 1/2003 decisions,68 the BIDS 
                                                 
56 Id., para. 21.  
57 Id., para. 32. 
58 Id., para. 33. 
59 Id., para. 34. 
60 Id., para. 33, 35. 
61 Id., para. 35. 
62 Id., para. 37. 
63 Id., para. 38. 
64 See e.g. Van der VIJVER, “The Irish beef case”, (2009) 30(4) ECLR 198 at 200. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Case C-209/07, above fn. 1, para. 36-39. 
67 Inter alia, Van der VIJVER, “The Irish beef case”, (2009) 30(4) ECLR 198 at 200-201. 
68 See e.g. Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810), [1984] OJ L207/17, 
para. 28-29; see also para. 31-35; Commission decision 94/296/EC of 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten 
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agreement was considered incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU, since it had sought to reduce 
overcapacity in an industry characterised by sluggish demand that had become permanent over 
time and had been certified by an independent expert.   
        Nonetheless, although in principle, the agreement could have been regarded as improving 
production and eventually bring appreciable benefits for consumers,69 it can be doubted that the 
arrangement would have met the “negative” requirements of Article 101(3).  The preliminary 
ruling indicates that the BIDS agreement was concluded by a number of firms amounting to 
90% of the overall market, thereby increasing the degree of concentration and minimising any 
threat of competition from remaining actors.70  Moreover, the imposition of non-compete 
obligations and of limits on the “exiting firms”’ freedom to dispose of their plants and land, 
especially by selling them to outside competitors, allowed the parties to “cement” that level of 
concentration by creating a considerable barrier to entry vis-à-vis potential competitors,71 thus 
eliminating almost any remaining competition. It is also clear from the ruling that without 
agreeing to a “compensation scheme”, the firms that had opted for remaining on the market 
would not have been able to attain their “minimum efficient scale” of supply and thereby improve 
their profitability without having to make losses or relinquishing the market.72  Consequently, it 
could be argued that the restrictions of competition agreed by the BIDS members were not 
“indispensable” to achieve its supposedly “beneficial” objectives, within the meaning of Article 
101(3)(c).73   
         Therefore it is doubtful whether, had the Court had the jurisdiction to decide on this, the 
BIDS agreement would have been eligible for the application of the legal exception provided by 
Article 101(3) TFEU.  Although the Court confirmed that in principle every agreement would be 
eligible for the application of that clause, it emphasised that through the BIDS agreement the 
parties had radically modified the structure of the market by concerted action and thereby been 
able to restructure the market without having to “weather” the consequences of the downturn, 
i.e. having either to relinquish the market or to merge.74  It is concluded that Barry Brothers does 
not only constitute a stark reminder of the seriousness with which the Court of Justice takes the 
application of Article 101 TFEU, even in times of economic uncertainty; it also seems to 
question, at least to a degree, the continuing applicability of those principles and approaches on 
which the Commission had relied in its crisis cartels decisions adopted before the enactment of 
Council Regulation No 1/2003. The next section will consider what the consequences of this 
decision are likely to be for the evolution of the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(IV/34.456), [1994] OJ L131/15, para. 32-34, 39-40.  See also, mutatis mutandis, Commission decision 87/3/EEC of 
4 December 1986—ENI/Montedison (IV/31.055), [1987] OJ L5/13, especially paras. 7-8, 21-22, 33-35. 
69 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 82-84; see also Competition 
Authority v Beef Industry development Society Ltd and another, judgment of 3 November 2009, [2009] IESC 72, 
disposal, part (a). 
70 Case C-209/07, above fn.1, para. 32.  Cf. e.g. Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres 
(IV/30.810), [1984] OJ L207/17, para. 32-33. 
71 Id., para. 35. 
72 Id., para. 31; see also para. 38-39. 
73 Id., para. 38.  Cf. Competition Authority v Beef Industry development Society Ltd and another, judgment of 3 
November 2009, [2009] IESC 72, disposal, part (b). 
74 Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [1994] ECR II-595, para. 85; see also para. 32, 35-39. See e.g., 
mutatis mutandis, case 6-72, Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Ltd v Commission, [1973] ECR 215, 
para. 19; see also para. 24-26. 
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3. Looking at Barry Brothers against the more general framework of Article 101 EU Treaty: 
what are its implications for the notion of ‘restriction of competition’? 
 
3.1. ‘Barry Brothers’ and Article 101: back to basics for restrictions by object? 
 
Section 2 discussed the Barry Brothers preliminary ruling in the light of the Commission’s 
practice relating to crisis cartels.  This section will consider what impact the preliminary ruling is 
likely to have on the current and future interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.75  Commentators 
suggested that the Court made a “move back to basics” in its interpretation of Article 101 
because it had confined the assessment of the existence of a restriction of competition to the 
realm of Article 101(1) and the appraisal of whether the latter could be justified by “broader” 
considerations, including those relating to industrial policy, to the four conditions listed in Article 
101(3).76  Having regard to the prohibition clause, the Court of Justice, whilst reiterating the 
distinction between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ infringements, rejected the argument that there 
should only be an “exhaustive list” of “hard core” anti-competitive practices77 and held that each 
practice should be examined in light of its content and purpose and of the restrictions it imposed 
on the freedom of action of the parties.78   
         Against this background, how we should construe the notion of ‘restriction of competition’ 
for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU emerges once again at the central question.  In her 
Opinion, AG Trstenjak focused on the actual function of Article 101 TFEU, namely safeguarding 
competition “as a process” to promote consumer welfare,79 and suggested that for there to be a 
restriction of competition it would have to be established not only that a given arrangement 
restrained the freedom to trade of the parties, but also that as a result of it competition would be 
adversely affected.80  In this context, the separate issue of whether individual practices 
restricted competition “by object” or “by effect” could only be decided after considering to what 
extent the former was inconsistent with the goals of Article 101.  If following this examination the 
arrangement was found to be ‘by [its] very nature (…) injurious’ to these goals, it would be 
sanctioned without taking a ‘close look’ at its actual impact on the market.81 In any other case, 
however, the practice would only be caught by Article 101(1) if, assessed in its actual legal and 
economic context, competition had been appreciably distorted.82 
         In Barry Brothers the Court of Justice confirmed the “textual dichotomy” between ‘by 
object’ and ‘by effect’ prima facie breaches and considered the seriousness of each 
infringement on the basis of the experience of its impact on competition.83  The Court drew a 
line between particularly damaging practices for the competitive process and forms of less 
“deleterious” behaviour.  The former will, due to their nature, be “presumed” to have anti-
competitive effects, without a separate inquiry as to their impact on the market being required.84  
The latter will have to be examined more closely and will be held to be prohibited by Article 
                                                 
75 Van der VIJVER, “The Irish Beef case”, (2009) 30(4) ECLR 198 at 200.  
76 Ibid.; see also SVETLICINII, “ECJ’s ruling in beef industry case: competition law must be observed at all times”, 
(2008) 12 Eur. L. Reporter 402 at 404-405.  
77Case C-209/07, above fn. 1, para. 16-17. 
78 Id., para. 17. 
79 Case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, AG opinion of 4 September 2008, above fn.1, para. 42. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, judgment of 25 November 2008, above fn. 1, para. 17.  For commentary, see e.g. 
ODUDU, The boundaries of EC Competition Law: the scope of Article 81, 2006: OUP, p. 114-115. 
82 See e.g. case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, above fn.1, para. 15.  For commentary, see inter alia, FURSE, 
Competition law of the EC and the UK, 2008: OUP, pp. 177-178. 
83 See e.g. case 56/65, STM v MBU, [1966] ECR 235, p. 248. 
84 Id., p. 249. 
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101(1) TFEU only if it can be shown that they have resulted in an appreciable distortion of 
competition.85   
         The judgment also appears to suggest that it should be possible, in application of this “in-
context” and more “economics principled” pattern of analysis, to rebut the “presumption of anti-
competitive” effects arising from a finding that a given practice had breached Article 101(1) by 
reason of its object.  AG Trstenjak pointed out that the need to consider all prima facie 
restrictive practices against their actual context should be ‘taken seriously’86 and as a result 
accepted that a party seeking to disprove the allegations of an infringement to prove the 
existence of ‘elements of legal and economic context which could cast doubt on the existence of 
a restriction of competition.’87   
         Another feature of the preliminary ruling was the emphasis on the distinction between, 
respectively, the inquiry as to the actual existence of a restriction of competition and the 
assessment of the extent to which the arrangement could be ‘tolerated’ as consistent with the 
four conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.88  It could be argued that this reading of the division of 
labour between Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU was consistent with earlier case law and therefore 
unsurprising.  Nonetheless, it is suggested that the Barry Brothers preliminary ruling should not 
be examined in isolation but should be read in the wider context of the more recent case law 
concerning Article 101 TFEU, including decisions concerning restrictions of competition ’by 
effect’.89  After considering in brief these judgments, the next sections will examine whether the 
method of analysis proposed by the Court of Justice for “less serious” restraints can be 
reconciled with that applied in “by object” cases.   
 
3.2. Article 101 and restrictions ‘by effect’: from restrictions of trade to the need to carry 
out a “counterfactual analysis”—a more economics based approach for this concept? 
 
Section 3.1 considered the implications of Barry Brothers for the notion of “restriction of 
competition”. It was argued that the preliminary ruling re-endorses the “bifurcated” structure of 
Article 101 TFEU and confirms the rigorous reading of the concept of restriction “by effect” and 
“by object” as “alternative requirements” for the application of the prohibition clause.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the Court of Justice expressly chose to analyse the arrangement against its 
actual legal and economic context, despite having found that it constituted an inherently 
“obvious” infringement of the competition rules, which, in turn justified a presumption of its anti-
competitive effects.  Against this background, it could be queried whether this analysis shares 
any common threads with the framework for assessment applied to restrictions “by effect” in 
recent decisions. 
         The limited purvey of this paper does not allow for an exhaustive examination of the case 
law concerning “by effect” restraints.90  Suffice to say that the Court of Justice has decidedly 
moved away from a “broad” reading of Article 101(1) TFEU according to which all practices 
having an adverse impact on the parties’ freedom to trade would be held incompatible with the 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, AG opinion of 4 September 2008, above fn.1, para. 50. 
87 Ibid.; for commentary, ODUDU, “Restriction of competition by object—what is the beef?”, (2008) Comp Law 11 
at 14 and 15-16.  But cf. case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, above fn. 1, para. 19-21 with, , mutatis mutandis, case C-
235/92 P, Montecatini v Commission, [1999] ECR I-4539, para. 122.  
88 See e.g. case T-112/99, Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 74; also, case T-374-75, 
384 and 388/94, European Night Services and others v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 135-136. 
89 Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcek v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991; case T-328/03, O2 v 
Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231; for commentary, see inter alia JONES, “Analysis of agreements under US and 
EC antitrust law—convergence or divergence?”, (2006) 51(4) Antitrust Bulletin 691 at 788. 
90 See e.g. case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcek v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991; mutatis mutandis, case T-
193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission, [2005] ECR II-209; Case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231.  
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Treaty competition rules to a more “selective” view of the notion of restriction of competition.91  
Accordingly, agreements not entailing “serious” infringements of the competition rules would 
have to be assessed in their actual context and would be prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU only 
if they had in fact appreciably impaired competition,92 taking into account the nature and 
quantity of the products affected, the size of the concerned parties and the existence of any 
‘networks’ of similar practices.93   
         It is also clear that this relatively more “restrained” reading of the concept of restriction of 
competition is directly related to the interpretation of the legal exception contained in Article 
101(3) TFEU.94  Commenting on the relationship between the prohibition clause and the legal 
exception within Article 101 TFEU Jones expressed the view that the EU Courts’ approach had 
resulted in de facto ‘dividing up’ the assessment of anti-competitive practices into two prongs: 
Article 101(1) TFEU addressed the question of whether an arrangement had had a negative 
impact on competition whereas Article 101(3) TFEU provided the legal framework to analyse the 
defendants’ pleas that their agreement had a beneficial impact on efficiency which outweighed 
its negative effects on rivalry.95   
         It is therefore suggested that the scope of the application of the legal exception is directly 
related to, and can consequently be defined only in the light of, the breadth assigned to the 
prohibition and especially to the notion of restriction of competition.  It is well-known that the 
relatively generous view of this concept was criticised by commentators on the ground that it 
could lead to ‘economically indefensible’ conclusions that Article 101(1) TFEU had been 
breached, especially in less serious cases.96  Furthermore, that broad reading of what 
constituted a restriction of competition inevitably resulted in shifting a significant part of that 
assessment to the framework of paragraph 3.  In response to these concerns, the Commission, 
as part of its plans of Modernisation of the competition enforcement structures, sought to 
elaborate a more “economics-based” approach to the prohibition clause.97   
         The 2004 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) (hereinafter referred to also as 
Article 81(3) Guidelines) reaffirmed the view of Article 101 TFEU as having a ‘bipartite 
structure’, between the prohibition clause—focused mainly on its negative effects for 
competition—and the legal exception—concerned instead with the assessment of any benefits 
stemming from a prima facie restrictive practice.98  To prove an infringement of Article 101(1) 
‘by effect’ it would therefore be necessary to demonstrate that as a result of the restraint, having 
regard to the actual context of the practice, competition was appreciably distorted; by contrast, 
                                                 
91 See e.g. case 56/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 429, pp. 472-473; also case 56/65, STM v 
MBU, [[1966] ECR 337.  For commentary see, inter alia, ODUDU, The boundaries of EC Competition law: the 
scope of Article 81, 2006: OUP, p. 98. 
92 Case 56/65, above fn. 91, p. 249. 
93 Id., p. 250; also case C-234/89, Delimitis v Henninger Brau AG, [1991] ECR I-935,para. 18-21. For commentary, 
see e.g. WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 116-117. 
94 See e.g. case C-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [[1994] ECR II-595, para. 85.  See also Commission 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), [2004] OJ C101/97 (hereinafter referred to as Article 81(3) 
Guidelines), para. 32-33. 
95 JONES, “Analysis of agreements under US and EC antitrust law—convergence or divergence?”, (2006) 51(4) 
Antitrust Bulletin 691 at 788. 
96 ODUDU, The boundaries of EC Competition law: the scope of Article 81, 2006: OUP, p. 99; see also pp. 105-
106; see e.g. case 56/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 429 at 433. 
97 JONES, above fn. 95, pp. 748-749; see also SCHWEITZER, “Competition law and public policy: reconsidering 
an uneasy relationship—the example of Article 81”, in DREXL et al., Economic theory and competition law, 2009: 
E Elgar, Cheltenham, p. 140. 
98 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para. 33; see also para. 40-41.  For commentary see SCHWEITZER, “Competition law 
and public policy: reconsidering an uneasy relationship—the example of Article 81”, in DREXL et al., Economic 
theory and competition law, 2009: E Elgar, Cheltenham, p. 144-145. 
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any allegation that the latter would be likely to benefit economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare could only be considered against the framework provided by the four conditions of the 
legal exception, without affecting the prior conclusion that the practice had infringed the 
prohibition clause.99  The Guidelines were consistent with long-standing EU courts’ case law 
according to which in the application of the prohibition clause there would be no space for a 
‘comparative assessment’ of the pro- and the anti-competitive effects of individual practices.100   
          However, in other judgments the EU Courts seemed to cast doubt at least in part on the 
“bipartite” structure they had developed for the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.  The Court 
firstly elaborated its concept of “ancillarity” of restrictions of the parties’ freedom of trade and 
took the view that restraints that were “necessary” and “proportionate” to pursue a ‘legitimate 
commercial purpose’ as well as, perhaps more controversially, a public interest goal could be 
regarded as falling outside the remit of Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.101 In more recent cases 
the Court of Justice was prepared to bring this more “economics-principled” and realistic 
approach to the prohibition clause a step closer to “balancing” the pro- and anti-competitive 
effects of individual practices, in a way which have been hitherto regarded as falling within the 
scope of the legal exception.102  
          In the Meca Medina case103 the Court of Justice held that although the decision of the 
association of undertaking at issue entailed a limitation in the freedom of action of an 
‘undertaking’ (namely, an individual engaged in sports activities for the purpose of gainful 
employment),104 it should not be regarded as automatically prohibited by Article 101, without 
analysing its legal and economic context.  The Court observed that since they pursued 
legitimate goals, i.e. the protection of the health of athletes and the integrity of competitive 
sports,105 and were limited to what was necessary to achieve that objective106 the anti-doping 
rules and especially the sanctions imposed for their infringement, were not incompatible with the 
Treaty competition rules.107  Thus, it was concluded that although they restrained the economic 
freedom of the applicants, these rules were not caught by the prohibition clause.108 
         Meca Medina was regarded by many commentators as confirming a cautious move 
toward the application of a ‘standard of reason’ in the interpretation of Article 101(1) EU Treaty 
to satisfy the demands of the public interest.109  Due to the nature of the case, it was queried 
whether the fact that the anti-doping rules had not been notified to the Commission to secure an 
                                                 
99 See e.g. case 56/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 429 at 472-473; also case T-112/99, 
Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 74. 
100 See e.g. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v US, 246 US 231 at 244; infra, sect. 4.2.  Cf. Case T-112/99, 
Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 72-74. 
101 Case 42/84, Remia BV v Commission, [1985] ECR 2545, para. 17-19; Case C-250/92, Gottrup Klim e.a. v Dansk 
Landburgs G. AmbA, [1994] ECR I-5641, para. 34-35; see also Article 81(3) Guidelines, para. 31-32.  See also case 
309/99, Wouters, para. 90, 97; see also para. 100-109.  For commentary, see inter alia, WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 129-
30; cf. MONTI, “Article 81 and public policy”, (2002) 39(5) CMLRev 1057 at 1083-85 and 1086-1087; also 
O’LOUGHLIN, “EC competition rules and free movement rules: an examination of the parallels and their 
furtherance by the ECJ Wouters decision”, (2003) 24(2) ECLR 62 at 64, 68-69; TOWNLEY, Article 81 EC and 
public policy, 2009: Oxford, Hart Publishing, p. 137-138. 
102 Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcek v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991, para. 24-25; see also, mutatis 
mutandis, case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission, [2005] ECR II-209, para. 91-99; for commentary see 
WHISH, above fn. 8, pp. 128-129. 
103 Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcek v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991. 
104 Id., para. 24-25.  See also, mutatis mutandis, case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission, [2005] ECR II-209, 
para. 91-99. 
105 Id., para. 43; see also para. 45-46. 
106 Id., para. 44; see also para. 47-49. 
107 Id., para. 42. 
108 Ibid. 
109 WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 130-31; also JONES, above fn. 95p. 785. 
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exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU could have played a part in the Court’s reasoning.110  It is 
acknowledged that, in any event, this decision does not sit very comfortably with the bifurcated 
structure of Article 101 TFEU suggested by the Commission, as a result of which it should only 
be within the framework of the four conditions for the application of the legal exception that any 
positive aspects of a prima facie restraint of competition should be weighed against its anti-
competitive effects.111   
         Whish suggested that this framework for analysis should be relevant only for restrictions of 
competition resulting from the operation of regulatory structures affecting the freedom of trade of 
undertakings in the public interest.112  By contrast, the “bifurcated” pattern of assessment 
entailed by Article 101 TFEU should apply to restraints on the freedom of trade stipulated for 
commercial purposes.113  Although this view may be appealing because of the subject matter of 
Meca Medina, it appears less sustainable in light of later developments which, instead, seem to 
suggest that this judgment could be part of a broader trend toward the introduction of a ‘EU style 
rule of reason’ in the application of Article 101(1) TFEU beyond “public interest” cases.114   
         In O2 v Commission, the applicant challenged the decision with which the Commission 
had found that a roaming agreement stipulated between O2 and T-Mobile infringed Article 
101(1) but could benefit from an exemption under Article 101(3) on account of its competition 
enhancing effects.115  On appeal, the General Court confirmed that the assessment of whether 
an agreement infringed Article 101(1) should be carried out having regard to the legal and 
economic context in which that agreement had been concluded and should especially take into 
account ‘its object, its effects’ and the extent to which it affected the pattern of trade between 
member states, having regard to the context in which the parties operated, the nature of the 
products or services affected by it and the features of the market.116  The Court made clear that 
this framework for assessment would be applicable to all practices and added that when an 
agreement did not entail a restriction on competition ‘by object’, for it to be prohibited the 
Commission should demonstrate the existence of ‘such factors (…) which show that competition 
has in fact being restricted (…) to an appreciable extent.’117 It was emphasised that this 
appraisal should compare the state of competition that existed in the absence of the agreement 
with the degree of competition that resulted from its existence and operation.   
         The General Court rejected allegations that to apply this kind of analysis would ‘amount to 
carrying out an analysis of the pro- and the anti-competitive effects’ of the agreement.118  
Instead, it pointed out that this examination would be focused only on the existence of 
appreciable anti-competitive effects stemming from the agreement and would therefore be 
based on an analysis of its actual impact on existing and potential competition.119  It 
emphasised that the roaming agreement had sought to “rebalance” the inequality existing 
between T-Mobile, who enjoyed a dominant position on the German mobile communications 
market, and O2, which was the last entrant into that market, by providing the latter with access 
to infrastructure that would have enabled it to compete with the existing incumbents.120   
                                                 
110 TOWNLEY, above fn. 101, p. 137-138. 
111 JONES, above fn. 95, p. 788. 
112 WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 130-31. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See e.g. JONES, above fn. 95, p. 786-787; also MARQUIS, “O2 (Germany v Commission and the exotic 
mysteries of Article 81(1)”, (2007) 32(1) ELRev 29 at 42-43. 
115 Case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231, para. 6. 
116 Id., para. 66. 
117 Id., para. 67-68; see also para. 69. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Id., para. 70-71. 
120 Id., para. 107-108. 
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         It was added that, although this arrangement had engendered a certain degree of 
dependence between the parties that dependence was, first of all, destined to disappear 
overtime and secondly, did not affect the ability of O2 to create its own infrastructure with a view 
to competing with the other incumbents on an independent footing.121  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the Commission decision, by failing to take into account the extent to which the 
agreement had enabled a new entrant to penetrate the relevant market and thereby would have 
achieved an increase in competition that would not have been feasible without the agreement 
itself, was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and should therefore be annulled.122 
         It is suggested that the O2 judgment came as something of a surprise if regard is had to 
the administrative decision it annulled.  The Commission, consistently with its Guidelines and 
with earlier case law, had first of all applied Article 101(1) to the roaming agreement and found 
that, due to its content and its objectives, the arrangement would have facilitated collusion in 
relation to important aspects of the parties’ conduct on the market.123  Secondly, it had 
considered whether the agreement complied with the four conditions listed in Article 101(3).124  
In this context, the Commission had identified efficiency-enhancing effects for the market and 
clear benefits for consumers stemming from the presence of a viable new incumbent.125  
Accordingly, it concluded that the agreement could benefit from the legal exception.   
         By contrast, the General Court, with its ‘counterfactual analysis’, conducted a far more 
‘searching inquiry’ into whether the practice constituted a restriction of competition.126  
Consequently, it is suggested that when an agreement or concerted practice does not contain 
any “obvious” restraints on competition, the inquiry as to whether Article 101(1) was infringed 
would have to concentrate on the extent to which any negative effects stemming from the limits 
placed on the parties’ freedom of action on the market had in fact resulted either in a distortion 
of or in an “increase” in competition, for instance because, thanks to the agreement, a new 
entrant had been able to start operating viably on the market.127 
         It is submitted that O2 represents a “good example” of the General Court’s willingness to 
apply sound economic analysis in the application of Article 101 TFEU.128  However, other 
commentators pointed out that despite rejecting in principle the idea of “balancing” pro- and anti-
competitive effects within Article 101(1), the Court had in fact employed a framework of analysis 
which was very similar to the legal standard applied by the US Supreme Court in respect to “rule 
of reason” infringements of Section 1 of the US Sherman Act.  The next section will attempt to 
provide a brief illustration of some of the principles underscoring the interpretation of the US 
Federal anti-cartel laws with a view to considering whether these conclusions can be justified. 
 
3.3. ‘Per se’ and ‘Rule of Reason’ infringements of Section 1 of the US Sherman Act—summary 
remarks 
 
Section 3.2 provided an outline of the approach adopted by the EU Courts in respect to ‘by 
effect’ restrictions of competition and highlighted some of the features of the “counterfactual 
analysis” applicable to these “less serious” infringements that resulted from the O2 judgment.  It 
was argued that despite expressly rejecting the applicability of a “rule of reason” type analysis to 
                                                 
121 Id., para. 108-109. 
122 Id., para. 114-116. 
123 Commission decision 2004/207/EC, T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany, [2004] OJ L75/32, see e.g. para. 91-93. 
124 Id., para. 121-128. 
125 Id., para. 129-130. 
126 MARQUIS, “O2 (Germany v Commission and the exotic mysteries of Article 81(1)”, (2007) 32(1) ELRev 29 at 
44. 
127 Case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231, especially paras. 68-69, 71-72, 75-79.  For commentary, 
see MARQUIS, above fn. 126, p. 44. 
128 See e.g. MARQUIS, above fn. 126, pp. 43-44.  Also, JONES, above fn. 95, p. 789-790. 
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these restraints the General Court had developed a framework for their assessment that was 
very similar to a comparative evaluation of their pro- versus anti-competitive effects.  This 
section will provide a brief summary of the manner in which the US Federal Courts have 
interpreted Section 1 of the US Sherman Act.  It is anticipated that this cursory examination will 
form the background against which the trends characterising the application of Article 101 TFEU 
will be considered in later sections. 
         As is well known, Section 1 of the US Sherman Act prohibits ‘every contract (…) in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations (…)’.  However, 
it soon became clear that, if it had been construed literally129 the scope of Section 1 would have 
gone as far as to prohibit, in substance, every contract capable of having an impact on trade.130  
Therefore, the Supreme Court held in its Standard Oil Co. decision131 that Section 1 should be 
interpreted in accordance with ‘a standard of reason’ and, consequently, should only prohibit 
those arrangements that after an investigation of their ‘competitive significance’132 place an 
‘undue restraint’ on the economic freedom of the parties.133   
         In assessing whether a restraint of trade is ‘unreasonable’ the decision-maker will have to 
consider whether, having regard to the ‘nature or character of the contracts’ and to the 
‘surrounding circumstances’, the practice gives rise to a ‘presumption’ that it has resulted in anti-
competitive effects, especially in the form of higher prices or reduced output.134  In this context 
the US Courts have employed two distinct, yet ‘complementary categories of antitrust analysis’, 
whose applicability is determined in relation to the nature of the actual arrangement in each 
case, to its nature and context and to the circumstances surrounding it.135 According to the US 
Supreme Court in National Professional Society of Engineers: 
 
‘ (…) In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so 
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality-they are “illegal per se.” In the second category are agreements whose 
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. (…)’136 
 
         On the basis of this approach, practices such as price fixing and the restriction of output or 
sales are normally regarded as falling within the first category137 since in these cases 
‘anticompetitive conduct [is likely to be] so great as to render unjustified further examination’ of 
the practice.138  To the second category, instead, belong those practices whose anti-competitive 
impact is not equally ‘immediate’ or ‘obvious’ in light of its content and purpose139 and for which 
                                                 
129 See e.g. US v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 318 (1897), 17 S. Ct. 540, especially at 547-48. 
130 E.g. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v US, 246 US 231 at 244.  
131 Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v US, 221 US 1 (1911).   
132 See e.g., NCAA v Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 at 103.  For commentary, see JONES, above fn. 95, 
p. 694-695. 
133 Standard Oil Co of New Jersey, above fn. 131 at 59-60.  See also, more recently NCAA v Board of Regents, 
above fn. 132, at 98. 
134 Standard Oil Co of New Jersey, above fn. 131, at 55. 
135 National Society of Professional Engineers v US, 435 US 679 at 692.  See e.g. JONES, above fn. 95, p. 696. 
136 Ibid. 
137 See, inter alia, NCAA v Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 at 98-99; also, Arizona v Maricopa County 
Medical Society, 457 US 332 at 356. 
138 Inter alia, NCAA v Board of Regents of Oklahoma, above fn. 137 at 103-104.  For commentary, inter alia, 
LEMLEY and LESLEY, “Categorical analysis in Antitrust jurisprudence”, J.M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No 348, Nov. 2007, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026967. especially pp. 7 et seq. 
139 See e.g. Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36 at 51. 
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the same ‘simple’ inquiry involved in the application of ‘per se’ rules will not be sufficient.  In 
these cases, it is necessary to carry out a “fuller”, more detailed inquiry.  
         As Mr Justice Brandeis famously held in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, ‘every 
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their 
very essence’. 140  An agreement not containing any “nefarious” restrictions of competition will 
therefore be subjected to a different test focused on ‘whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition’,141 having regard to ‘the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature 
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable’.142 
         The meaning and the implications of the rule of reason test as enunciated by Brandeis J 
has been widely debated and the limited scope of this paper does not allow for any detailed 
consideration of its impact.  It is however indispensable to point out that despite the inevitable 
difficulties arising from its application, this approach came to be almost the “default” test for the 
application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.143  Consequently, the remit of the ‘per se’ rules 
would be necessarily limited to those practices having so ‘pernicious effects on competition and 
lacking any redeeming virtues’ that can be simply presumed to be unreasonable without any 
more elaborate inquiry being necessary.144  
         It will be illustrated in later sections that the line between ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’ 
infringements of Section 1 is now less “bright” than at the time of Standard Oil Co.145  However, 
if the analysis conducted so far is contrasted with the approach to Article 101(1) TFEU adopted 
in O2, a number of similarities may be detected between the “counterfactual analysis” applied 
by the General Court and the rule of reason approach resulting from Board of Trade of the City 
of Chicago.  It is submitted that at the basis of its decision the General Court, in a way which 
reminded of the Supreme Court’s dictum in Board of Trade, was an emphasis on the need to 
assess whether the prima facie restrictive agreement could “enhance” or “suppress” 
competition: in this context, the Court took the view that, since the roaming agreement had 
actually allowed the entry of a new rival, it should not be caught by the prohibition of Article 
101(1) TFEU.146  This reading of Article 101(1) appears, however, difficult to reconcile with the 
view adopted by the EU Courts in earlier decisions and with the Commission’s own 
Guidelines147 and could be regarded as having made the “leap” toward a view of ‘by effect’ 
restrictions whose compatibility with Article 101 TFEU had been considered doubtful in several 
earlier judgments.148   
         It may therefore be concluded that the approach to restrictions of competition ‘by effect’ 
has undergone significant change, moving from a nearly “catch all” notion, designed to cover 
any restraint on the freedom of trade of the undertakings concerned, to a far more restrained 
concept.  However, the analysis of the O2 decision suggested that due to the application of that 
“counterfactual analysis”, practices that may have been found to be injurious to competition in 
the past may now be considered to be “neutral” for competition and, furthermore, that some of 
                                                 
140 Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v US, 246 US 231 at 244. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36 at 51. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Below, section 4.2., fn. 174 and accompanying text. 
146 Case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231, para. 40-41; cf. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v 
US, 246 US 231 at 244. 
147 Case T-112/99, Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 72-74. 
148 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-238/05, Asnef/Equifax and others v Ausbanc, [2006] ECR I-11125, para. 28-
29, 55-60. 
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the analysis that has hitherto taken place against the framework of the legal exception now 
occurs as part of the “in-context” approach that the prohibition clause now entails.   
         Consequently, a number of question emerge: first of all, what does this all mean for the 
dichotomy between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ restrictions? Second, what is the function of Article 
101(3) TFEU today? If the analysis of alleged allocative efficiency gains is to be conducted as 
part of the Article 101(1)’s “counterfactual” test, what kind of effects and goals should the four 
conditions of the legal exception take into considerations, especially in less serious cases?  And 
what, if any, are the implications of Barry Brothers for the overall pattern of analysis that should 
be applied to individual cases in order to determine the existence of a restriction of competition?  
These questions will be addressed in the next sections.  
 
4. “Modernising” the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU: has a more economics 
based notion of restriction of competition emerged? And with what effects? 
 
4.1. Can the “orthodox” reading of ‘by object’ infringements be reconciled with the “new 
view” of ‘by effects’ breaches? 
 
Section 3 summarily discussed both the “orthodox” approach to Article 101 TFEU adopted in 
Barry Brothers and the meaning and implications of the “flexible” analysis applicable to 
restrictions of competition ‘by effect’.  This section will examine the implications of Barry 
Brothers for the current interpretation of the prohibition clause.  It is recalled from Section 2.3 
that the Court of Justice in Barry Brothers firmly upheld the distinction between ‘by object’ and 
‘by effect’ restraints enshrined in the Treaty.  However, the preliminary ruling also indicated that 
whether a given agreement fell within one or the other “category”, far from being based on an 
“exhaustive list” had to be determined in each case by way of an examination of its “content and 
purpose” against its legal and economic context.  It would only be after this examination that the 
type of inquiry (whether “presumptive” or “actual”) as to the impact of the arrangement on rivalry 
would have to be determined.   
         The reading of the prohibition clause contained in Barry Brothers may be contrasted with, 
for instance, European Night Services.  In that judgment the General Court seemed to suggest 
that a different framework for analysis would have to apply to “more serious” as opposed to 
“less obvious” restraints.  It was held that in applying Article 101(1) TFEU,  
 
‘account should be taken of the actual conditions in which [the practice] functions, in 
particular the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products (…) 
covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market (…), unless it is an 
agreement containing obvious restrictions of competition such as price fixing, market 
sharing or the control of outlets (…)’.149 
 
         As a result, a number of commentators argued that a differentiated approach should be 
adopted to scrutinise “hard-core” infringements indicated by the General Court.  According to 
this approach, it would not be necessary to consider these practices in their legal and economic 
context: their anti-competitive effects would be merely “presumed” and they would be regarded 
as infringing Article 101(1) TFEU only on the basis of their content and their purpose.  It would, 
however, still be possible for the parties to the agreement to demonstrate the existence of any 
pro-competitive effects stemming from that practice and to prove that the latter fulfilled the four 
conditions required for the application of the legal exception of Article 101(3) TFEU.150 By 
                                                 
149 Case T-374-375/94, ENS v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 136 (emphasis added). 
150 See, inter alia, JONES and SUFRIN, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, 2nd Ed., 2008: OUP, p. 
183-184; see also JONES, above fn. 95, p. 757, 760-761. 
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contrast, “less obvious” prima facie infringements would have to be considered against their 
legal and economic context; their anti-competitive effects should not be only “presumed”, but 
would have to be carefully appraised in order to determine whether, as a result of the practice, 
competition had actually been hampered.151  
         Against this background, it is legitimately doubted that the careful examination conducted 
by the Court of Justice in Barry Brothers remains consistent with the pre-existing apparently 
stark dichotomy between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ infringements suggested in ENS.152  It is 
argued that the Court of Justice in Barry Brothers did not stop at considering the objectively 
“hard-core” nature of the restraints that the BIDS deal entailed153 but preferred to conduct a 
close scrutiny of its individual clauses against their legal and economic context before 
concluding that the arrangement, both as a whole and in its individual parts, had restricted 
competition ‘by object’.154   
         Consequently, it is suggested that the pattern of analysis applied in Barry Brothers could 
be read as an attempt to extend some aspects of the more “economics-guided” approach to the 
concept of restriction of competition elaborated in ‘by effect’ cases to more serious, ‘by object 
infringements of Article 101(1)155 and especially to take into account parameters that had 
hitherto been relevant for the application of the legal exception contained in Article 101(3) 
TFEU.156  Thus, in relation, for instance, to the legal appraisal of the clauses imposing a 
compensation fee and limiting the parties’ freedom to dispose of the “decommissioned” plants 
the Court emphasised that the arrangement would, for the purpose of reducing overcapacity, 
have resulted in the market being “sealed off” to external rivals and in the market shares being 
de facto ‘frozen’ for a significant length of time.157  That conclusion, taken together with the 
scope of the arrangement, which affected 90% of the existing competitors, led the Court of 
Justice to declare the BIDS agreement unlawful by reason of its object.158  
         In light of the above analysis it is submitted that in Barry Brothers the Court of Justice 
confirmed the bifurcated structure of Article 101 TFEU and as a result the relevance of 
“industrial policy” goals only for the purpose of applying the legal exception of paragraph 3.  
However, it engaged in a thorough analysis of the BIDS agreement and focused on the gravity 
of the BIDS agreement and especially on the question of whether any anti-competitive effects 
could be “presumed” due to the seriousness of the infringements or, instead, should have been 
specifically investigated.159  It is acknowledged that this scrutiny is not entirely “new” to the EU 
                                                 
151 See case T-374-375/94, ENS v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 136; for commentary, see ODUDU, The 
boundaries of EC Competition law: the scope of Article 81, 2006: OUP, p. 113-114. 
152 Cf. National Society of Professional Engineers v US, 435 US 679 at 692; also Board of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v US, 246 US 231 at 244; for commentary, JONES, above fn. 95, pp. 760-761.  For commentary, inter alia, 
LEMLEY and LESLEY, “Categorical analysis in Antitrust jurisprudence”, J.M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No 348, Nov. 2007, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026967, pp. 7-8.  Cf. Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v 
Commission, [1994] ECR II-595, para. 85, 109-110; for commentary, inter alia, WHISH, above fn. 8, pp. 125-126. 
153 See case T-374-75, 384 and 388/94, European Night Services and others v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, 
para. 136; also case C-209/07, above fn. 1, para. 21. 
154 Id., para. 37-39. 
155 Case C-209/07, above fn. 1, per AG Trstenjak, para. 52-54. 
156 Id., para. 36-38 of the judgment.  Cf. para. 36-41 with case T-112/99, Metropole and others v Commission, 
[2001] ECR II-2459, para. 156-160. 
157 See case C-209/07, above fn. 1, e.g. para. 32, 35-36. 
158 See, inter alia, id., para. 36-39; cf., mutatis mutandis, Commission decision 84/380/EEC, Synthetic Fibres, 
[1984] OJ L207/17, para. 43-44. 
159 Case C-209/07, above fn. 1, para. 14-15, 16-17. 
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Courts.160  However, it is suggested that in the preliminary ruling the Court of Justice “went a 
step beyond” its existing case law by emphasising the need to analyse the BIDS agreement 
against the very structure of the market and especially against the degree of concentration that 
characterised it, and to appraise its consequences for foreclosure as well as for current and 
future market shares.161  It is therefore concluded that Barry Brothers, despite being largely 
inspired by an orthodox view of Article 101 TFEU, is clearly rooted in the “flexible” and “in-
context” approach that had hitherto mainly been applied to ‘by effect’ cases.162  However, what 
is its impact on the current and future interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU?  This question will 
be addressed in the following section. 
 
4.2. A more “economics-based” approach to “serious” breaches of competition: from 
“literal dichotomy” to “continuum” between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ restraints? 
 
The previous section examined the approach to ‘by object’ breaches of Article 101(1) TFEU 
adopted in Barry Brothers and discussed it against the wider context of the recent case law 
regarding “less serious” restrictions of competition.  It was illustrated that the Court of Justice 
engaged in a very detailed analysis of the content and objectives of the BIDS agreement 
against its legal and economic context and in particular against the actual market conditions.163  
However, it was also pointed out that the Court adopted an approach resembling many of the 
features of the legal standard applicable to less serious infringements and encompassing 
aspects that in past cases had been relevant for the application of Article 101(3).   
         It may be queried how we can “reconstruct” the Court’s approach to the prohibition clause.  
Should we still regard it as a “categorical” one, as a result of which, once a prima facie 
infringement has been found to fall in the ‘by object’ “box”, it will be presumed to have anti-
competitive effects?164  Or would it be preferable to consider the Court of Justice’s current 
approach as one akin to the idea of “continuum”, as a result of which the type of assessment 
should be framed in light of the practice’s nature and inherent seriousness as well as the 
inherent features of the market?165   
         It should be emphasised that according to the Court of Justice the need to assess prima 
facie Article 101(1) infringements in their legal and economic context would not be limited to 
specific categories of agreements but covered any practice suspected of being anti-
competitive.166  Consequently, it could be argued that, at least in its “initial stages” the analysis 
would be the same for all types of anti-competitive arrangements, since it would concentrate on 
their “content and purpose”: if the latter are so pernicious that they are almost inevitably likely to 
harm consumer welfare, they will be caught by the prohibition clause without the need to 
conduct an autonomous inquiry into their actual impact on competition in the relevant market.167  
                                                 
160 Case T-112/99, Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 74-75; see also case 56/65, STM 
v MBU, [1966] ECR 235, p. 248; also,  mutatis mutandis, case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, above fn. 1, per AG 
Trstenjak, para. 48-49. 
161 Case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, above fn. 1, para. 36-39. 
162 Id., para. 37-38; see also AG Opinion, para. 83-93; for commentary, see ODUDU, “Restriction of competition by 
object—what is the beef?”, (2008) Comp Law 11 at 13. 
163 Case C-209/07, Barry Brothers, above fn. 1, para. 31 et seq. 
164 Case T-374/94, ENS v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 136.  For commentary, see WHISH, above fn. 8, 
p. 118. 
165 See e.g. California Dental Association v FTC, 526 US 756 at 780-781; for commentary, inter alia, LEMLEY and 
LESLEY, “Categorical analysis in Antitrust jurisprudence”, J.M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford 
Law School, Working Paper No 348, Nov. 2007, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026967, pp. 9-10. 
166 See e.g. case C-551/03, General Motors v Commission, [2006] ECR I-3173, para. 64, 66. 
167 Inter alia, case 56/65, STM v MBU, [1966] ECR 235 at 249; also case C-209/07, above fn. 1, para. 15. 
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However, if this ‘initial inquiry’ does not reveal such nefarious features, ‘the lawfulness of an 
agreement (…) must be tested according to its anti-competitive effects’ and the practice will only 
be prohibited if it can be shown that competition has been distorted as a result of it.168   
         Against this background, it is argued that the Court has moved away from a strictly “literal” 
and “categorical” approach to Article 101(1) and toward a legal standard for analysing the 
content and purpose of any agreement, that focuses more on their inherent seriousness rather 
than on their “formal” characteristics.169  In accordance with the standard applied in Barry 
Brothers, the decisive question would be whether its “content and purpose” is compatible with 
the objectives of Article 101 TFEU, i.e. economic efficiency for the purpose of promoting 
consumer welfare, and not whether they belong to a relatively formalistic category, as European 
Night Services, for instance, could have suggested.170   
         Or, to put it in a different way, it could be argued that, in accordance with the analysis 
employed in Barry Brothers, as one “moves along” the imaginary continuing line existing 
between “more serious” and “less obvious” prima facie infringements, the applicable type of 
inquiry would have different features. If the content and purpose of an individual agreement 
appear to be in conflict with the very function of Article 101(1) TFEU the prohibition clause ‘can 
be applied absent measured inefficiency or inefficiency predicted using economic tools’ and on 
the basis of an assumption that, according to ‘sufficient experience of particular conduct and of 
its impact’ that agreement is likely to lead to damage to competition.171  If, instead, the outcome 
of the inquiry as to the content and purpose of a practice does not reveal such degree of 
seriousness as to warrant antitrust intervention without assessing its actual economic 
consequences, then it will be necessary to test its actual impact on competition and especially 
whether the latter has been distorted.172   
         On this point, a parallel, albeit not a perfect one,173 can be drawn with the US Supreme 
Court’s decisions in NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma174 and in 
California Dental Association v FTC.175  In NCAA, the Court held that there was no ‘bright line 
separating ‘per se’ from rule of reason inquiry’176 and explained that whether ‘the ultimate 
finding [was] the product of a presumption or [of] actual market analysis’177 constituted the 
expression of the same type of appraisal which will focus on the ‘competitive significance of the 
restraint’ and especially on its ability to suppress or promote competition.178   It was added in 
California Dental that in conducting this type of scrutiny the judge would have, in substance, to 
                                                 
168 WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 118; see e.g. case 56/65, STM v MBU, [1966] ECR 235 at 249. 
169 Per AG Trstenjak, para. 50; see also para. 80-81 and para. 23 of the judgment.  Cf. case T-374/94, ENS v 
Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 136. For commentary, see ODUDU, above fn. 162, p. 15; also WHISH, 
above fn. 8, p. 140.   
170 Case T-374-75, 384 and 388/94, European Night Services and others v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 
136. 
171 ODUDU, The boundaries of EC Competition law: the scope of Article 81, 2006: OUP, p. 113-114. 
172 Inter alia, WHISH, above fn. 8, p. 118; see e.g. case 56/65, above fn. 168, p. 249. 
173 See e.g. Commission decision 2004/1307 of 7 April 2004, Societe Air France/Alitalia S.p.A, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38284/en.pdf, especially para. 132-137 and 154-162; Case 
T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [1994] ECR II-595, para. 85; also case T-374/94, ENS v Commission, 
[1998] ECR II-3141, especially paras. 135-137; case C-209/07, above fn 1, see e.g. para. 39 of the judgment and 
para. 51-54, 56-58 of the AG Opinion.  For commentary, see   e.g. JONES, above fn. 95, p. 750-751; WHISH, above 
fn. 8, p. 118-119. 
174 468 US 85. 
175 526 US 756. 
176 NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 at 104, fn. 26. 
177 Id., p. 104. 
178 Ibid. 
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‘frame’ a standard of review that she regarded as ‘suitable’ to the case before her, in light of the 
‘circumstances, details and logic’ of the alleged infringement.179   
         The Supreme Court held that since ‘no categorical line’ could be traced between 
‘intuitively anti-competitive’ practices and those whose negative effects on rivalry are ‘less 
obvious’,180  ‘what [was] required (…) [would be] an enquiry meet for the case’ considering, 
respectively, ‘whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, 
that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick 
(or at least quicker) look in place of a more sedulous one.’181 
         In light of the above analysis, it is argued that the Court of Justice, in a way which was not 
dissimilar from the US Supreme Court in NCAA and California Dental, has come to 
acknowledge the existence of a continuum in its analysis of the content and purpose of 
individual prima facie restrictive practices.  This appraisal would concentrate on the seriousness 
of each arrangement in its actual context and would attach different legal consequences to 
different degrees of gravity of the infringement: the more serious the prima facie breach is, the 
more likely it will be for it to have anti-competitive effects and, consequently, to justify ‘early 
antitrust intervention’ by way of the application of a presumption of anti-competitive impact.  If, 
instead, a practice is not obviously “dangerous” for genuine competition, it will be necessary to 
consider its actual effects on the market: in these cases, “early intervention” would therefore not 
be justified.182  However, the adoption of a more “flexible” and “economics-based” approach to 
the prohibition clause raises issues for the scope of the Article 101(3) and especially for the 
extent to which the changes in the interpretation of Article 101(1) may have an impact on the 
scope of application of the legal exception.  This question will be addressed in the next section.  
 
4.3. From “dichotomy” to “continuum” in the interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU: what 
are the implications for the legal exception of Article 101(3)? 
 
Section 4.2 tried to gauge the impact of Barry Brothers on the interpretation of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  This section will attempt to analyse some of the consequences of the decision for the 
legal assessment entailed by the legal exception of Article 101(3) TFEU and applicable to 
arrangements that have been found to be anti-competitive following the suggested “continuum” 
appraisal.183  It was illustrated that at least up to the Metropole judgment184 whereas the legal 
analysis to be conducted under the prohibition clause is only limited to ascertaining whether an 
arrangement constitutes a restriction of competition either by reason of its ‘object’ or in view of 
its ‘effects’,185 the function of the four conditions for the application of the legal exception would 
be to gauge the extent to which the practice, despite its harmfulness, nonetheless enhances the 
competitive process.186  Gains in terms of ‘allocative’ as well as of ‘productive’ efficiency would 
have to be taken into account and ‘weighed in’ against its anti-competitive effects.187  
                                                 
179 California Dental Association v FTC, 526 US 756 at 780. 
180 Id., p. 781. 
181 Ibid. 
182 See, mutatis mutandis, ODUDU, above fn. 171, pp. 118-121 and 157. 
183 See e.g. Commission decision 2004/1307 of 7 April 2004, Societe Air France/Alitalia S.p.A, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38284/en.pdf.  Cf. case T-328/03, O2 v Commission, 
[2006] ECR II-1231, especially para. 69-73.  More recently, see case C-209/07, above fn. 1, see e.g. para. 34, 37-38; 
see also AG Opinion, para. 83-93; for commentary, inter alia, ODUDU, above fn. 162, p. 13. 
184 See e.g. case T-112/99, Metropole and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 74-79. 
185 See MANZINI, “The European rule of reason—crossing the sea of doubt”, (2002) 23(8) ECLR 392 at 396-397. 
186 See e.g. case 56/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 429, pp. 472-473; see also Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, para. 13, 17-18.  For commentary, see e.g. MANZINI, above fn. 185, pp. 395-396. 
187 Ibid.; see also Article 81(3) Guidelines, para. 13, 17-18. 
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         This interpretation was, however, widely criticised.188  Commentators argued that the 
subject matter of the inquiry enshrined in the prohibition differed from that provided in the legal 
exception: whereas paragraph 1 should concentrated on the existence of a “restriction of 
competition” and should therefore focus on the question of whether a given practice had 
adversely affected allocative efficiency and thereby consumer welfare, paragraph 3 should seek 
to capture any positive effects for productive efficiency that could be ‘passed on’ to consumers 
without substantially impairing the remaining competition.189  Accordingly, other authors 
suggested that the more “economics-principled” appraisal conducted under Article 101(1)190 
would not impinge upon the applicability of the legal exception.  It would only ensure that only 
those agreements that are clearly incompatible with ‘competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources’191 would be 
prohibited and as a result that Article 101(3) TFEU was only applicable to those cases in which 
the “balancing” of anti- and pro-competitive effects is actually required.192   
         However, although this interpretation is very attractive, it does not seem to be able to “tell 
the whole story” about the actual application of the legal exception.  It is recalled from section 2 
that Article 101(3) has been employed to pursue objectives that are not strictly of an “economic” 
nature.193  For instance, in CECED the Commission granted an exemption for an arrangement 
under which a number of domestic appliances’ producers had agreed to jointly phasing out the 
production of energy inefficient washing machines on the ground that reducing the supply of 
more energy intensive appliances would have allowed manufacturers to concentrate on more 
energy efficient products, with clear gains in terms of overall productive efficiency and with clear 
benefits for consumers in the form of less energy consumption as well as less environmental 
pollution.194  Commenting on this decision, Townley argued that ‘environmental protection’, 
rather than economic efficiency, was ‘the (…) inspiration’ for the decision,195 although the 
Commission had been very careful in its attempt to ‘cloak environmental criteria in economic 
language’196 to “fit” them within the framework of paragraph 3.197   
         In the light of the above discussion, a question arises as to what function Article 101(3) 
TFEU should fulfil in individual cases: should its remit be limited to a productive efficiency 
inquiry? Or should it instead play the role of ‘public policy exception’ to the application of the 
sanction of nullity?  It was argued in section 4.2 that the prohibition clause, far from being 
“fashioned around” the formalistic dichotomy between by object and by effect infringements,198 
seems now to be evolving toward a “continuum” between “nefarious” breaches and “less 
obvious” restrictions of competition, as a result of which the type of inquiry as to its impact on 
the market—i.e. whether anti-competitive effects should only be presumed or would have to be 
                                                 
188 See e.g. ODUDU, above fn 171, pp. 157-158; also NAZZINI, “Article 81 between time present and time past: a 
normative critique of ‘restriction of competition’ in EU law”, (2006) 43(2) CMLRev 497 at 504-505. 
189 ODUDU, above fn. 171, pp. 102 et seq.; see also pp. 128-131. 
190 MARQUIS, “O2 (Germany) and the exotic mysteries of Article 81”, (2007) 32(1) ELRev 29 at 37. 
191 Commission Article 81(3) Guidelines, para. 13; for commentary, see NAZZINI, above fn. 188., p. 520; also 
ODUDU, “A new economic approach to Article 81(1)?”, (2002) 27(1) ELRev 100 at p. 103-104. 
192 See ODUDU, above fn. 171, pp. 157-158.  Also NAZZINI, “Article 81 between time present and time past: a 
normative critique of ‘restriction of competition’ in EU law”, (2006) 43(2) CMLRev 497 at 504-505, 519. 
193 See, inter alia, case C-67/96, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, [1999] 
ECR I-5751, para. 54. 
194 Commission decision 2000/475/EEC of 24 January 1999, CECED, [2000] OJ L187/47 at para. 47-54. 
195 TOWNLEY, above fn. 101, p. 152. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Id., p. 149-50; see also WHISH, above fn. 8, pp. 153-154; ODUDU, above fn. 171, pp. 102 et seq.; see also pp. 
128-131.  See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad, [2002] ECR I-1577, per AG Leger, 
para. 104 (in relation to the remit of Article 101(1)).   
198 See e.g. case T-374/94, ENS v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141, para. 135-137.   
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actually demonstrated, in accordance with a counterfactual analysis—and therefore its 
(il)legality would have to be determined.199   
         It is therefore argued that when an infringement is not among the “hard-core” restraints, 
such as price fixing, the role of the legal exception would have to be limited to an inquiry of the 
extent to which the practice furthers productive efficiency200 and/or seeks to achieve specific 
public policy goals.201  It was suggested that especially after O2, which affirmed the applicability 
of a counterfactual analysis to “less serious” restrictive practices, a limited degree of ‘balancing’ 
of their positive against their negative effects would be required to determine whether a 
restriction on competition had actually occurred.202  Consequently, it is submitted that in these 
cases the remit of the legal exception’s four conditions would be confined to capturing the 
benefits of individual practices to, e.g. technological advancement or to the Treaty’s ultimate 
goals, even those of a less obviously “economic” nature.203   
         By contrast, when after the examination of its ‘content and purpose’204 it is found that the 
practice constitutes a serious breach of Article 101(1) TFEU, the assessment required by Article 
101(3) would have to cover a wider range of issues.  It is argued that in these cases the legal 
exception would not only retain its function of productive efficiency and ‘public policy exception’, 
but also provide a forum within which to appraise any allocative efficiency benefits in light of the 
four conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.205  Accordingly, it is suggested that the inquiry required 
for the application of the legal exception to more serious infringements would have to be wider 
than for less obvious restraints on competition, in as much as it would encompass any inquiry 
as to the “gains” arising from the agreement itself, ranging from considerations of allocative 
efficiency to gains in technical advancements to, eventually, allegations that the practice in 
issue had pursued public policy objectives.206   
         It could be argued that adopting this view of the scope of the assessment required by 
Article 101(3) TFEU for, respectively, “less obvious” and “hard-core” prima facie infringements 
does not appear entirely consistent with the idea of “continuum” which, it was suggested, seems 
to inform, at least in part, the interpretation of the prohibition clause, especially after more recent 
decisions of the Court of Justice.207  It is therefore suggested that the pattern of analysis 
advocated for the application of the legal exception would sit uncomfortably with that adopted 
for the application of Article 101(1) TFEU since it would entail, respectively, a “more penetrating” 
inquiry for hard-core infringements and a somehow less extensive appraisal for less serious 
suspected breaches.  However, it could be argued that this different and apparently partly 
contradictory “logic” may be justified in light of the existing principles governing the application 
of the legal exception.  It was noted in earlier sections that according to the case law of the EU 
Courts and to the practice of the Commission, a very exhaustive examination would have to be 
                                                 
199 Inter alia, case C-209/07, above fn. 1, see e.g. para. 34, 37-38.  
200 See ODUDU, above fn. 171, pp. 137 et seq. 
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conducted before deciding if “hard core” infringements could nonetheless benefit from the 
application of Article 101(3() TFEU.208   
         Accordingly, it is submitted that applying a more extensive inquiry to these “more serious 
breaches” would be consistent with the existing case law, according to which a particularly 
‘pressing justification’ would have to be provided before applying the legal exception to “serious 
infringements” of Article 101(1).209  Having regard, instead, to the type of appraisal proposed for 
“less obvious” prima facie infringements, it is suggested that an inquiry limited to the extent to 
which the latter pursued specifically “public policy” and productive efficiency-related objectives 
would similarly be justified by the nature of the assessment carried out already under Article 
101(1) TFEU.  It is argued that not only would these “less serious” prima facie breaches be 
subjected to a pervasive inquiry as to their content and purpose and especially to the actual 
impact that they have on competition for the purpose of the application of the prohibition clause; 
they would also be less likely to be inconsistent with the objectives pursued by the EU Treaty’s 
antitrust rules by reason of their less damaging content.210 
         It is concluded that the evolving interpretation of the prohibition clause appears to have 
partly altered the overall structure of Article 101, including the type of inquiry entailed by the 
legal exception.  It is suggested that the nature of the infringement and the “place” in which the 
latter can be positioned along the “continuing line” between more and less serious infringements 
is likely to determine how wide ranging the inquiry for the purpose of applying the legal 
exception is going to be—i.e. whether it should take into account the extent to which competition 
was enhanced as a result of (or perhaps despite) a “serious” antitrust breach or should instead 
be limited to productive efficiency issues, as with ‘by effects’ cases, that are analysed in 
accordance with the counterfactual pattern of analysis.211 
 
5. Between “orthodoxy” and a more “economics-based” approach: how is the Court of Justice 
shaping the interpretation of Article 101 EU Treaty?  Tentative conclusions 
 
It is beyond doubt that the application of Article 101 EU Treaty has undergone major changes in 
the past decade or so, all of which have shaped the manner in which the provision is applied. In 
this respect, a continuing theme appears to underscore this discussion, namely the need to 
ground the application of Article 101 EU Treaty in sound economics to minimise decision-
making errors and to secure legal certainty, clarity and predictability.212  This paper examined 
the implications of the recent Barry Brothers preliminary ruling both for the application of the EU 
antitrust rules to “crisis cartels” and for the ongoing development of the approach to Article 101 
EU Treaty.  It was argued that while the Court of Justice’s decision was not totally surprising, 
given the seriousness of the restraints that the BIDS agreement entailed, it sends out a strong 
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warning call for those companies wishing to rely on similar arrangements to tackle the economic 
downturn in their industry.213   
         Thereafter, the paper attempted to gauge some of the overall implications of the Barry 
Brothers decision for the approach to the interpretation of Article 101(1) of the Treaty.  It was 
illustrated how the Court of Justice adopted a very “orthodox” reading of the “bifurcated” 
structure of Article 101 TFEU, taken as a whole, as well as, in the context of the prohibition 
clause, of the concept of “restriction of competition”.  In that respect, however, the Court 
emphasised the need to undertake an “in-context” analysis of the prima facie anti-competitive 
practices, even when they entailed “hard-core” restraints.  Consequently, another, more general 
question emerged, namely whether this ruling could be reconciled with the existing and 
relatively controversial case law concerning the legal appraisal of restrictions of competition ‘by 
effect’. It was argued that the application of a “counterfactual analysis” to less serious anti-
competitive practices would ensure that only those restraints having an actual adverse impact 
on competition within the relevant market would be prohibited by the EU antitrust rules.  Or, to 
put it in a slightly different way, it was suggested that the prohibition clause appears to have 
been applied to catch only these practices that entail a “real” restriction of competition, after a 
careful, in-context and economics-based appraisal.   
         The paper briefly examined the more recent developments in the interpretation of Section 
1 of the US Sherman Act and relied on that examination to provide a background against which 
to reflect on how the apparently “orthodox” approach to ‘by object’ infringements can be 
reconciled with the counterfactual analysis emerging for less obvious breaches.  It was argued 
that the Court of Justice of the EU appears to have embraced a concept of “restriction of 
competition” as a ‘spectrum’ ranging from more to less serious competition infringements214 and 
therefore to have moved away from a “stark” distinction between ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’ 
breaches.215  It was acknowledged that this parallel could not be “perfect”, due to the significant 
differences existing between Article 101 TFEU and the US antitrust rules.  However, the paper 
respectfully suggested that the interpretation emerging from the Court of Justice’s recent 
judgments resembles the position adopted by the US Supreme Court in its California Dental 
Association decision, in which the Court had distanced itself from a neat distinction between ‘per 
se’ and ‘rule of reason’ infringements to adopt the view that the scope of Section 1 should 
encompass a “continuum”, as a result of which the type of inquiry for each practice would have 
to be determined in light of its nature and seriousness.216   
         It is concluded that the Court of Justice seems to be no longer “straitjacketed” by an 
apparently “literal approach” to Article 101(1) TFEU or indeed by the limits of the ongoing 
debate on whether any of the elements of a “standard of reason” should be incorporated in the 
application of the Treaty competition rules.217  Instead, the more recent decisions can be 
understood as suggesting a strong commitment to uphold an “in-context” and economics-based 
interpretation of the prohibition clause and, hence, to a “modernised” reading of Article 101 
TFEU.   
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